What else is happening in Seventh Circuit today?…
Riva v. Pella Corp. No. 13-2133, -2133, -2136, -2162, -2202 (U.S. June 2, 2014)
POSNER, Circuit Judge, “In this case, despite the presence of objectors, the district court approved a class action settlement that is inequitable— even scandalous. The case underscores the importance both of objectors (for they are the appellants in this case—without them there would have been no appellate challenge to the settlement) and of intense judicial scrutiny of proposed class action settlements.
After eight largely wasted years, much remains to be done in this case. For starters, Saltzman, Paul Weiss, and Weiss’s firm, Complex Litigation Group, must be replaced as class representative (Saltzman), and as class counsel (Weiss and his firm), respectively. And since we are rejecting the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs named in the third amended complaint, whom that agreement caused to be substituted for the original named plaintiffs (other than Saltzman), must be discharged and the four original named plaintiffs (whom we’ve called the “defrocked” plaintiffs) re-instated.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.”
U.S. v. Shawn M. Siegel, No. 13-1633, -1640 (U.S. May 29, 2014), and U.S. v. Haywood Norfleet, Nos. 13-1633, -1640 (U.S. May 29, 2014).
POSNER, Circuit Judge, “We have consolidated these two criminal appeals because (with an exception discussed at the end of the opinion) both challenge only conditions of super-vised release, imposed by the district court, and because the challenges raise closely related issues concerning such conditions. The issues ramify far beyond these two cases, however, which exemplify common but largely unresolved problems in the imposition of such conditions as a part of federal criminal sentencing.
So the prison sentences in both our cases stand, but the cases must be remanded for reconsideration of the condi-tions of supervised release that we have determined to be inappropriate, inadequately defined, or imposed without the sentencing judge’s having justified them by reference to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.”
U.S. v. Lacrelle J. Clay, No. 13-3510 (U.S., May 29, 2014).
FLAUM, Circuit Judge, “LaCrelle Clay challenges his 24-month term of reimprisonment for violating his conditions of supervised release. Clay argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on a factor from the sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—“the need for the sentence imposed … to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”—that is not listed in the statute governing postrevocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). We now join the majority of circuits that have addressed the question and conclude that consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revoking supervised release is not a procedural error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.”